A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DROPBOX SOFTWARE SECURITY

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DROPBOX OVERVIEW

Dropbox: a leader in Cloud backup

- Over 50 million users
- Estimated company value: over $1 billion
- (Year: 2011 / Source: Wikipedia)

Client software available for

- Windows, OS X, Linux, Android, iOS and web browser

Lot of competitors

- Google Drive, SkyDrive, iCloud, box.com ...

DROPBOX OVERVIEW

Dropbox security record (partial)

- March 2011: Dropbox client for Smartphones do not make use of SSL/TLS encryption
- April 2011: Derek Newton realized that login/password is useless (if you happen to know host_id secret)
- June 2011: a software upgrade issue provided password-free access to all user accounts for one day
- USENIX 2011: "Dark Clouds on the Horizon“
- August 2012: a stolen password from Dropbox employee lead to massive spam

DROPBOX OVERVIEW

Why studying Dropbox ?

- Dropbox is a leader
- No previous work on the effective implementation
- "LAN Sync" protocol routinely observed during penetration testing assignments
- We are happy Dropbox users too ☺

DROPBOX OVERVIEW

Further analysis holds true for client versions 1.1.x to 1.5.x

Windows, Linux and OS X clients are mostly written in Python

- "How Dropbox Did It and How Python Helped" (PyCon 2011)

Windows client

- Generated using PY2EXE
- A ZIP with all PYC files to be found within PE resources
- Python 2.5 interpreter has been slightly customized

Source quest

SOURCE QUEST

Standard PYC (redux)

- PYC is Python bytecode
- PYO is Python optimized bytecode

Bytecode version	Timestamp	Marshalled bytecode
b3 f2 0d 0a	0d f1 5c 50	63 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 06 00 00 00 40 00 00		00 73 16 01 00 00 78 43
00 65 00 00 64 00 00 83		01 00 44 5d 30 00 5a 01

Dropbox PYC

b3 f2 0d 0a	0d f1 5c 50	63	70 f9 79 04	8e 20 00
00	90 e0 95 65 67 29 9d	83	7b 7d f3 16 1e 2a 68	

SOURCE QUEST

Diffing **PYTHON25.DLL** with original

- 53 modified functions (out of ~4500)
- Opcodes have been swapped in **PyEval_EvalFrame()**
- Decryption function added in **ReadObjectFromString()**

Which encryption algorithm is used ?

- **0x9e3779b9** constant is linked to TEA symmetric encryption family

  Here: **XXTEA**
- **MT_getnext()** / **MT_decrypt()** functions are involved

SOURCE QUEST

XXTEA implementation

void btea(char *data, uint32 len, uint32 const key[4])



ReadObjectFromString()

- Read 1st byte (e.g. **0x63** = code)
- 1st DWORD (e.g. **0x0479F970**) used for key generation
- 2nd DWORD (e.g. **0x208e**) gives block size

Not as easy as it may sounds

Spurious NULL bytes all over the place

SOURCE QUEST

Bytecode decompilation

- Pyretic / unpyc
  - Targets **Python 2.5** (Fails in real life)
- Uncompyle2
  - Targets **Python 2.7** only (Works in real life)

Our solution

- Uncompyle2 fork
- Bytecode translator 2.5 & 2.6 ► 2.7
- Single decompilation engine
- Kudos to Eloi Vanderbeken

https://github.com/Mysterie/uncompyle2

CODE INJECTION (BONUS)

PYTHON25.DLL is not easy to reach

- Anonymously mapped in memory
- Not easy to locate import / export tables
- Some functions like **PyRun_File()** are nop'ed

Yet …

- **PyRunString()** is not patched
- Arbitrary Python statements can be run in Dropbox context ☺

DEBUG MODE

- Debugging is hard
- **DBDEV** environment variable to the rescue

Dropbox <= 1.1

```
def is_valid_time_limited_cookie(cookie):
  t_when = int(cookie[:8], 16) ^ 1686035233
  if abs(time.time() - t_when) < 172800:
    if md5.new(cookie[:8] +
'traceme').hexdigest()[:6] == cookie[8:]:
      return True
```

DEBUG MODE

Dropbox ≥ 1.2

```
IS_DEV_MAGIC = DBDEV and
hashlib.md5(DBDEV).hexdigest().startswith('c3da6009e4')
```

DEBUG MODE

DBTRACE can help, too

```
10.224 | MainThread: Dropbox-win-1.1.45 (2796) starting

10.865 | MainThread:  u'host_id' = u'ab75c...

13.509 | MainThread: Opened Dropbox key

32.356 | RTRACE: Sending trace 1327936014
(C:\...\Dropbox\l\4f26b5fc)

33.058 | STATUS: Creating named pipe

59.318 | UPLOAD_HASH: Next needed hash:
AUCwQ6iYIfVxGs1f6HjkWZgqcbmWZiTCs6HU8HRykzU
```

DEBUG MODE

… and many others

- **DBMEMPROF**, **DBCPUPROFILE**, **DBPROFILE**
- **FAKE_BLOCK**
- **DROPBOX_HOST**

Who's in charge here?

- host = 'tarak.corp.dropbox.com‘
- Not exposed on the Internet ☺

GIMME RESULTS …

… not excuses !

CONFIGURATION DATABASE

SQLite 3 database: **config.dbx**

- Dropbox < 1.2: easy to dump
- Dropbox ≥ 1.2: "encrypted" SQLite

Encryption

Not: http://sqlcipher.net/

But: http://www.hwaci.com/sw/sqlite/see.html

Activation password == license key == default value ☺

Namely: **7bb07b8d471d642e**

CONFIGURATION DATABASE

Encryption key is machine-protected

Windows

- Seed stored in `HKCU\Software\Dropbox\ks\Client`
- DPAPI encryption

Linux

- Seed stored in `~/.dropbox/hostkeys`
- Custom "obfuscator" (reversible encryption)

Mac OS X

- Seed stored in `~/.dropbox/hostkeys`
- Custom "obfuscator" based on `IOPlatformSerialNumber`, `DAVolumeUUID` and more
- Kudos to the Mac OS X developer for full API re-implementation!

CONFIGURATION DATABASE

Effective encryption key is `PBKDF2(seed)`

Please use this information for forensics purpose only ☺

```
USER_HMAC_KEY = '\xd1\x14\xa5R\x12e_t\xbdw.7\xe6J\xee\x9b'
APP_KEY = '\rc\x8c\t.\x8b\x82\xfcE(\x83\xf9_5[\x8e'
APP_IV = '\xd8\x9bC\x1f\xb6\x1d\xde\x1a\xfd\xa4\xb7\xf9\xf4\xb8\r\x05'
APP_ITER = 1066
USER_KEYLEN = 16
DB_KEYLEN = 16
```

Network protocols

NETWORK PROTOCOLS

Network traffic

- fully transported over HTTPS
- OpenSSL + nCrypt wrapper
- Proper certificate checking
  - Hardcoded CA list

```
root_certs = '#          Subject:
C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape
Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, (…)

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n

MIIDEzCCAnygAwIBAgIBATA

(…)

L7tdEy8W9ViH0Pd\n

-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n\n'
```

NETWORK PROTOCOLS

Issues

OpenSSL … **0.9.8e** ?

- as of DropBox 1.4.17
- Hello **CVE-2011-4109**, **CVE-2012-2110**, and others

nCrypt … completely buggy and unsupported software?

http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=614051

No patch since 2007

NETWORK PROTOCOLS

File synchronisation: RSYNC protocol

File storage: Amazon Cloud S3

Implementation details

- Blocks of 4 MB in size
- SHA-256 of each block
- Encryption is provided by SSL/TLS only

DROPBOX PROTOCOL

Servers of interest

Blockserver: manages 4MB blocks

Authserver: user authentication, software setup

Metaserver: handles information requests about files and directories

Metaexcserver / **blockexcserver**: handle exceptions

Statserver / **notifyserver**: statistics

```
set_server(ret, 'blockserver', secure=True, timeout=60, **non_exc_kwargs)
set_server(ret, 'metaserver', secure=True, timeout=90, **non_exc_kwargs)
set_server(ret, 'metaexcserver', secure=True, timeout=90, **exc_kwargs)
set_server(ret, 'blockexcserver', secure=True, timeout=90, **exc_kwargs)
set_server(ret, 'statserver', secure=True, timeout=90, **exc_kwargs)
set_server(ret, 'notifyserver', secure=False, timeout=90, **non_exc_kwargs)
```

DROPBOX PROTOCOL

HOST_ID

- Unique and forever user identifier
- 128-bit length
- Server-side generated on 1st installation
- Not affected by password change
- Stored in local configuration database

HOST_INT

- Unique identifier per device

NS_MAP

- User namespace identifier
- Killed "dropship" hack

  Before: **get_block(hash_for_block)**

  After: **get_block(hash_for_block ; ns_map + host_id)**

LAN sync protocol

LAN SYNC PROTOCOL

Local sync between two Dropbox clients

- Discovery: UDP/17500 broadcasts
- Data exchange: TCP/17500

Data exchange protocol

- Each Dropbox instance can act as a Client or a Server
- Client SSL/TLS authentication
  - Key pair in configuration database

LAN SYNC PROTOCOL

Attacking a client in server mode

- Requires a server-known key pair ☹

LAN SYNC PROTOCOL

Attacking the client mode

- Server certificate is not checked

LAN Sync protocol (redux)

- HELLO / HOWDY
- PING / PONG
- HAS / HASREPLY / HASFAIL (+ hash)
- GET / GETREPLY / GETFAIL (+ hash & file content)

LAN SYNC PROTOCOL

Demo !

QUESTIONS